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In this moment, millions of animals are being held under terrifying conditions in factory farming. Moreover, wildlife is dying in Australia because of bushfires linked to (anthropogenic) climate change. Considering that these are only two of the numerous examples of misery non-human animals have to face in the Anthropocene, it is not an accident that the debate about animal ethics has gained much attention in the last decades and years. Two key concepts in animal ethics are moral standing and moral status. If an entity has moral standing, it counts morally and can be wronged. For example, most people would say that a cat has moral standing. Just think of a cat being kicked for fun. In such a case, the cat is obviously wronged. A moral status is then a property had by entities that have moral standing. As understood in this paper, the moral status of an entity consists of the set of features that govern how we ought to treat those entities. One crucial question when it comes to both of these two concepts is in favour of what they are had. Answers in animal ethics include mostly either capacities like sentience or as human specific interpreted capacities like intelligence and creativity. However, when one looks beyond analytical philosophical writings, one finds another valid candidate for grounding moral standing and moral status of entities: vulnerability. Often, vulnerability is understood as a solely negative property of being exposed to threatening influences like terror and discrimination. However, this is not the sense of vulnerability I will draw on. The sense I will draw on is a Butlerian one. Understood that way, vulnerability is an ontological feature of entities that denotes openness to the external world. Also, vulnerability in this sense is a gradual phenomenon as openness to the external world comes on a continuum. I will argue that vulnerability in this sense can operate as an appropriate marker for both moral status and moral standing. Any appearance of vulnerability in an entity ascribes moral standing to that entity and the moral status is then defined by the specific kind in which vulnerability is had by that entity. Moreover, I will argue that this account supports a vegan lifestyle. As a baseline level of vulnerability accounts for moral standing, and the most basic feature of a moral status is that an entity is not to be deprived of its openness to the external world, practices which exploit animals are prohibited on that account. For example, as keeping chicken in a cage deprives them of exploring in their environment, this act is prohibited on the proposed account. In the last section, I will suggest that the proposed account can deal better with problems than its prominent alternatives such as the appeal to sentience as it leaves room for moral claims of animals which, according to today’s scientific knowledge, do not feel harm, such as several insects. Benedikt Namdar(Department of Philosophy, Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz) Comments are closed.
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